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In the Shadow of the Omnipresent Claw: 
In Response to Professors Cherry & Wong 
Michael C. Macchiarola† 
As the American economy continues to totter against an 
ever-growing populist momentum, it seems likely that claw-
back mechanisms of various sorts will be put to increasing use 
in the coming months and years.1 Very generally, a clawback 
attempts to regain previously conferred monies or benefits fol-
lowing a certain triggering event, usually involving some 
change in circumstances. In a sense, clawbacks offer the oppor-
tunity for a “do-over”—a convenient antidote to both the uncer-
tainty that characterizes American financial markets and the 
calls for accountability that grow louder with each corporate 
 
†  Distinguished Lecturer, City University of New York. The author 
wishes to thank his wife, Jennifer, and his three children, Erin, Maggie and 
Brian, for all of their love and support. The author also wishes to thank his 
editor, Kara Bovee, for her tireless efforts. Copyright © 2010 by Michael C. 
Macchiarola. 
 1. See, e.g., Spencer C. Barasch & Sara J. Chesnut, Controversial Uses of 
the “Clawback” Remedy in the Current Financial Crisis, 72 TEX. B.J. 922, 927 
(2009) (“As governmental entities, court-appointed receivers and trustees, and 
corporations continue to react to the financial crisis, aggressive use of claw-
back remedies can be expected.”); Alexis Leondis & Margaret Collins, Empty 
Clawbacks?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 25, 2010, at 20, available at 
Business Source Premier, File No. 47601293 (noting that 70 of the top 100 U.S. 
companies by revenue have clawback provisions allowing them to recoup reve-
nues from executives); see also Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, “Clawbacks” of 
Executive Compensation, GIBSON DUNN PUBLICATIONS (Jul. 9, 2008), http:// 
www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/ClawbacksOfExecutiveCompensation 
.aspx [hereinafter Gibson Dunn Memo] (“[T]he subject of recouping, or ‘claw-
ing back,’ executive compensation in the event of financial statement errors is 
likely to remain a focal point for boards of directors.”). In fact, the trend to-
ward including clawbacks as part of compensation schemes is already well un-
derway. A recent industry report found that “[f ]rom 2006 to 2009, the preva-
lence of Fortune 100 companies with publicly disclosed clawback policies 
increased from 17.6 percent to 72.9 percent.” See Press Release, Equilar, 
Clawback Policies Get More Clarity in 2009 (Nov. 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.equilar.com/press_20091118.php. 
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misstep, real or perceived.2 Yet, as Professors Cherry and Wong 
note in Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era of 
Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes (the “Ar-
ticle”), the term clawback “has been subject to neither rigorous 
analytical scrutiny nor definition and exposition.”3 Against this 
backdrop, the authors’ undertaking to advance a so-called doc-
trine of clawbacks is both bold in its aspiration and laudable in 
its result. The Article succeeds in establishing a firm founda-
tion for additional examination and discovery and highlights 
the importance of clear rules of the road to guide all market 
participants.  
This Response (the “Response”) attempts to bolster and 
improve upon the still nascent discussion surrounding claw-
backs. Moreover, the Response challenges Professors Cherry 
and Wong, and the academic community more broadly, to ad-
dress a number of questions that remain unsettled. It seems in-
tuitive that the retroactive imposition of clawbacks, by legisla-
tion or otherwise, is less desirable than more prospective 
efforts.4 Yet, the complexity of the subject matter demands 
more than a reflexive call for the organic inclusion of clawback 
provisions in investment contracts or compensation agreements 
as a matter of course.  
This Response proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces 
the basic framework through which the Article’s authors ana-
lyzed the uncertain world of clawbacks. This section very brief-
 
 2. See, e.g., Andrew Grossman, The AIG Clawback: Possibly Unconstitu-
tional, Doubtlessly Imprudent, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 19, 2009), 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/03/The-AIG-Clawback-Possibly 
-Unconstitutional-Doubtlessly-Imprudent (describing the efforts to recoup AIG 
bonuses as “intended to punish the company’s employees and executives for 
conduct that Congress and the public believe demonstrates greed and selfish-
ness”). But cf. Lawrence A. Cunningham, A.I.G.’s Bonus Blackmail, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009, at A27, available at 2009 WLNR 5101548 (“[M]oral out-
rage and public rebuke do not provide legal grounds for backing out of a con-
tract.”). Yet, Professor Cunningham fails to make appropriate accommodation 
for the fact that the obligation to pay under the employment contracts, origi-
nally owed by the AIG shareholders, has now “been foisted upon [the taxpay-
er] through the mechanism of the financial bailouts.” Miriam A. Cherry & Jar-
rod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era of Excessive 
Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368, 379 (2009). 
 3. Cherry & Wong, supra note 2, at 411; see also Robert A. Prentice and 
Dain C. Donelson, Insider Trading as a Signaling Device, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 
15 (2010) (observing that clawback provisions were “essentially unknown” be-
fore Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 4. Larry Ribstein, Clawbacks, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (June 23, 2010), 
http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/06/23/clawbacks/ (“A mandatory provision 
that operates prospectively is at least better than one inserted ex post.”). 
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ly recounts the Madoff and AIG affairs. Here, little exposition is 
required, as both episodes remain fresh in the minds of most 
Americans. Part I also introduces the mechanics of the claw-
back in the less controversial context of the long-established 
preference period immediately preceding a firm’s bankruptcy 
filing. Part II examines the lens through which Professors 
Cherry and Wong suggest that market participants under-
stand, interpret and employ clawbacks. This section also intro-
duces the primary shortcoming of their approach—its latent 
subjectivity. Part III offers additional critiques, primarily con-
cerned with the practical difficulties in realizing the robust and 
developed clawback regime the authors envision. Finally, I con-
clude with a warning that the clawback does not represent the 
magic bullet it might first appear to be. And, we should resist 
reflexively embracing its application absent careful considera-
tion and deliberation. 
I.  CHERRY AND WONG’S “CLAWBACK” ANALYSIS   
Cherry and Wong examine two episodes from our recent 
past—the AIG executive bonus fiasco and the Madoff Ponzi 
scheme payouts to investors—to illustrate the clawback in ac-
tion. The two affairs are not easily latticed, as one concerns 
government ineptitude and subsequent remorse and the other 
features a massive fraud and ensuing bankruptcy. In each in-
stance, however, monies previously disbursed are sought for re-
turn.5 
In the AIG matter, following the insurance giant’s near 
bankruptcy and subsequent government bailout, Congress pur-
sued a retroactive marginal tax rate of ninety percent on the 
performance-based bonuses that AIG proposed to pay to its ex-
ecutives.6 Political posturing aside, it appears as though the 
proposed tax was targeting the recovery of the compensation 
that AIG awarded its employees for meeting certain perfor-
mance goals when the company’s performance was later found 
 
 5. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on 
the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 323, 334 (2009) (“[The clawback] seems useful to protect shareholders 
against managers’ ability to create the appearance of performance or to pro-
vide coinsurance against apparently profitable strategies that fail when eval-
uated over a longer timeframe.”). 
 6. For a brief description of the events surrounding the AIG “clawback,” 
see Cherry & Wong, supra note 2, at 368–69. For a concise summary of AIG’s 
demise, see Stephen J. Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. 
L. REV. 319, 319–20 (2010). 
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to be illusory.7 In the case of the Madoff investors, Federal 
Bankruptcy Court Judge Burton Lifland recently found himself 
playing King Solomon, left to decide the question of whether a 
trustee is authorized to clawback from one set of the fund’s in-
vestors for the benefit of another investor group.8 Of the Ar-
ticle’s two examples, the Madoff case highlights the more tradi-
tional variety of a clawback, applying the device to recover 
payments that were made out of the corrupt fund before its 
fraud was uncovered and to redistribute those monies to the 
victims pursuant to the priorities established by the Bankrupt-
cy Code.9 The AIG case is a newer flavor, born of the desire to 
revisit compensation previously paid to employees in the event 
that a firm’s reality turns out less rosy than it once appeared.10 
Few actually dispute that any payments (whether return of 
principal or earnings) an entity makes in the ninety days prior 
to the filing of a bankruptcy petition must be returned in toto to 
a bankruptcy trustee. Under the Bankruptcy Code, such a 
payment is presumed by law to be a “preference,” favoring the 
interests of a withdrawing creditor over other creditors at a 
time when the firm’s bankruptcy was inevitable.11 Preference 
law reaches back over a defined period prior to bankruptcy and 
 
 7. See generally John Cassidy, Wall Street Pay: Where’s the Reform?, THE 
NEW YORKER RATIONAL IRRATIONALITY BLOG (Jul. 23, 2010), http://www 
.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2010/07/wall-street-pay.html (bemoan-
ing bonus-laden incentive structures that provide “traders and their managers 
a big incentive to generate short-term gains while ignoring longer-term risks”). 
 8. For a brief description of the events surrounding the Madoff “claw-
back,” see Tally M. Wiener, On the Clawbacks in the Madoff Liquidation Pro-
ceeding, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 221 (2009). See also Diana B. Henri-
ques, In Court, Impassioned Challenges of Madoff Trustee’s Plans, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 2, 2010, at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 2234184 (describing the argu-
ments before the Bankruptcy Court on behalf of the so-called winning and los-
ing investors); Erik Larson, Madoff Victims Wait for Ruling on Claims as 
Judge Hears Case, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=avn0fdJxHQCY (describing the trustee’s 
methodology and the positions of the various stakeholders). 
 9. See Bennett W. Lasko, “Clawbacks” in the Aftermath of Madoff and 
Other Investment Frauds, DRINKER BIDDLE HEDGE FUND ALERT (Mar. 11, 
2009), http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/files/Publication/e65f9106-d70f-4aca-881f 
-0369a75ff435/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5c09f9ad-7e87-4e87-b0b6 
-0bd14571a404/Aftermath%20of%20Madoff.pdf (describing and explaining the 
two types of clawback claims: preference actions and fraudulent conveyance 
actions). 
 10. While certainly beyond the scope of this Article, one cannot help but 
wonder whether the federal government would like to replay its “fund first, 
diligence later” approach to the entire AIG episode.  
 11. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006).  
  
2010] OMNIPRESENT CLAW 5 
 
attempts to level the overall treatment received by similar 
creditors. The resulting restructuring of transactions is not in-
tended to imply that any particular prepetition transfer was 
somehow immoral or improper at the time that it was made.12 
Rather, individual prepetition transfers are avoided in order to 
ensure fidelity with the Bankruptcy Code’s goal of equitable 
distribution of a debtor’s assets or income.13 
Beyond these preference decisions, however, the curious 
world of clawbacks becomes far more inchoate. 
II.  EXAMINING CHERRY AND WONG’S “CLAWBACK”   
In a broader context, Professors Cherry and Wong offer 
that the term “clawback” generally describes a mechanism de-
signed to address “inequities that cannot easily be resolved by 
existing remedies under the law because of countervailing legal 
rights independently supporting such inequities.”14 Further, 
their Article attempts to make the case that clawbacks can ef-
fectively “bridge the gap in remedies under prevailing law for 
addressing unfair enrichment.”15 
Introducing the “unfair enrichment” concept seeks to syn-
thesize clawbacks; yet it also highlights the uncertainty that 
accompanies their implementation. According to Cherry and 
Wong, the concept represents a close cousin to the better-
known unjust enrichment, yet “extends to those situations 
where the enrichment cannot readily be said to be unjust (per 
unjust enrichment principles).”16 By such an interpretation, the 
clawback can be utilized even when the one being enriched can 
assert a preexisting legal right to the payment.17 Of course, 
traditional unjust enrichment principles would preclude such 
an application, instead only allowing recoupment of monies 
where the recipient lacks an adequate legal basis for receipt in 
 
12.See generally 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, 
NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 66:1 (3d ed. 2008) (indicating that 
the preferential transfer provisions were created to avoid “payments or other 
prepetition transfers made to a creditor that increase the creditor’s recovery 
ahead” of similar creditors). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Cherry & Wong, supra note 2, at 414. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 413 (“[U]nfair enrichment could be regarded as a variant, albeit 
an unfamiliar one, of unjust enrichment.”). 
 17. See id. 
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the first place.18 While the unjust enrichment standard might 
be seen simply as a mechanism to refuse to enforce an ineffec-
tive or defective attempt at transfer, the unfair enrichment 
standard goes quite a bit further.  
The professors offer the following example to illustrate 
their unfair enrichment remedy at work: 
[A]lthough an individual AIG executive may be blameless and have 
otherwise valid contractual rights to a bonus, payment of the bonus is 
unfair because bonuses should not be decoupled from a company’s 
performance, particularly where taxpayer money is involved. We thus 
have to turn to a retroactive clawback to override the contractual 
rights in this situation in order to prevent unfair enrichment of the 
executive.19 
The suggested response to the so-called blameless execu-
tive’s situation seems so noble, yet suffers from unnecessary in-
flexibility. Moreover, it has all the feel of analysis worked 
backwards from a desired result. Subjective notions of unfair-
ness aside, it is not difficult to envision a scenario in which it is 
entirely appropriate to decouple an individual’s bonus from a 
company’s performance.20 A compliance officer’s bonus, for ex-
ample, need not be tied to a company’s sales successes or prof-
its. In fact, a compliance officer or in-house legal employee at 
AIG might have become more valuable as the company’s per-
formance began to wane (and its employees became more des-
perate to keep up appearances or compromise best practices). 
In a similar vein, a company whistleblower would certainly be 
less likely to come forward with a claim in a regime where her 
legitimate contractual rights to a bonus might be compromised 
as a consequence of her own disclosures. Moreover, if such a 
whistleblower could potentially protect taxpayer monies, the 
chilling effect of the proposed unfair enrichment regime could 
be all the more unfortunate. 
 
 18. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 1 cmt. b (Discussion Draft 2000) (“Unjustified enrichment is enrichment that 
lacks an adequate legal basis: it results from a transfer that the law treats as 
ineffective to work a conclusive alteration in ownership rights.”). 
 19. Cherry & Wong, supra note 2, at 414. 
 20. In fact, a burgeoning scholarship is developing around the notion, once 
popular, that incentive pay should be limited. See, e.g., Jay Lorsch & Rakesh 
Khurana, The Pay Problem, HARVARD MAG., May–June 2010, at 35 (“The re-
cent economic crisis and the role that our compensation systems played in fo-
menting it require a holistic re-examination not only of compensation but of 
the assumptions and values underlying the economic system we have 
created.”). 
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The concept of “unfair enrichment,” as described by Profes-
sors Cherry and Wong, introduces unwelcomed subjectivity to 
decisions of whether and to what extent a person’s monies 
might be subject to return at some future date. Most basically, 
the authors fail to answer why the contractual risk bargained 
for by two arms-length parties should be subject to the later as-
sessment of an interloping arbiter. In fact, in the scenario they 
outline, the fact that neither party to the contract necessarily 
feels aggrieved seems of little consequence. Nonetheless, where 
unfair enrichment is the watchword, some all-knowing, all-fair 
third party arrives to set the world straight. The authors re-
main remarkably silent on just who constitutes the “we” in 
need of protection in the example that they offer. Also absent is 
an explanation of just who should decide whether to character-
ize a certain payment as somehow “unfair.”  
The authors’ example is particularly troubling for those 
concerned with the predictive value of the rule of law. It is like-
ly that, in such a world, the transaction cost of contracting will 
rise as private arrangements more routinely become subject to 
Monday-morning quarterbacking. And, of course, inequity is of-
ten in the eye of the beholder.21 Unlike the traditional respect 
for a preexisting right, the Article’s test serves to highlight the 
difficulty of a clawback regime that lays waste to any clear line 
of delineation, and instead favors burdening payment recip-
ients with the task of vigilantly monitoring the rear view mir-
ror.22 Under the authors’ proposed approach, a legitimate worry 
 
 21. For example, not all will agree with the authors’ assertion that “al-
though an individual AIG executive may be blameless and have otherwise val-
id contractual rights to a bonus, payment of the bonus is unfair because bo-
nuses should not be decoupled from a company’s performance, particularly 
where taxpayer money is involved.” Cherry & Wong, supra note 2, at 414; cf. 
Jake DeSantis, Dear A.I.G., I Quit!, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2009, at A29, availa-
ble at 2009 WLNR 557590 (asserting, in a letter to the CEO of AIG, that he 
was entitled to his full bonus earned as an executive vice president of the 
company, that he “deserved to be paid as promised,” and observing that he 
“personally suffered . . . with the rest of the taxpayers”). On the other hand, 
some might think that the authors’ interpretation does not go far enough. See, 
e.g., Kate Phillips, Senator Wants Some Remorse from C.E.O.’s, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 18, 2009, at A17, available at 2009 WLNR 5101597 (clarifying the earlier 
comments of Senator Charles Grassley who suggested that the AIG executives 
should consider committing suicide). 
 22. Traditionally, unjust enrichment provides a more reliable and objec-
tive standard. For example, the following five elements generally establish un-
just enrichment: (1) an enrichment; (2) an impoverishment; (3) a connection 
between the enrichment and the impoverishment; (4) an absence of a justifica-
tion for the enrichment and impoverishment; and (5) an absence of a remedy 
provided by law. See Schroeder v. Buchholz, 622 N.W.2d 202, 207 (N.D. 2001).  
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arises that employees or investors will come to fear that their 
monies are forever doomed to the fate of the stuffed animal in 
the arcade game—never free to relax in the shadow of the om-
nipresent claw.  
The law of fraudulent conveyance applies to a bankruptcy 
beyond the preference period and its thoughtful prescription 
can be instructive for clawbacks more broadly.23 Under state 
law and the Bankruptcy Code, for example, if the debtor sells 
its assets for insufficient value, that transaction may be undone 
as a constructive fraudulent transfer.24 In the context of a Pon-
zi scheme, “[t]he basic rule is that withdrawals of fictitious 
profits have to be returned to the bankruptcy estate, whereas 
redemptions of principal do not, unless the investor knew or 
should have known of ‘red flags’ at the time of the transac-
tion.”25 The theory behind such a rule is that when an investor 
buys into a fraudulent fund, she also purchases a rescission 
claim against the fund and its operators.26 A later redemption 
of principal, in turn, reduces the investor’s rescission claim dol-
lar-for-dollar by the redemption amount, and the Bankruptcy 
Code considers this reduction to be an exchange of equivalent 
 
 23. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 2 (positing that whether any AIG 
bonuses constitute fraudulent conveyances is a “relevant question for the gov-
ernment to probe”). 
 24. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006). Again, the clawback should not be seen as 
a punitive provision aimed at punishing a wrongdoer. See, e.g., Eric Pan, Ma-
doff Investors Redemptions Subject to Clawback, CARDOZO L. (Mar. 13, 2009), 
http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/MemberContentDisplay.aspx?ccmd=BlogDisplay&
ucmd=UserDisplay&userid=10534&contentid=10212&folderid=2364&clt=Blog 
(“[The clawback] represents a determination by Congress that redeeming in-
vestors should be in the same position as other similarly situated investors 
who did not redeem.”). But cf. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (stating that if the deb-
tor transfers its assets with the actual intent to harm creditors, an “actual” 
fraudulent transfer might be both avoidable and a criminal offense). 
 25. Lasko, supra note 9, at 2; see also In re Bayou Group, 396 B.R. 810, 
844–51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (allowing defrauded investors to retain with-
drawals of principal to the extent that they could prove that the withdrawals 
were not taken after the investor became aware of “red flags”). In a recent re-
lease, the SEC provided a nonexhaustive list of these “red flags.” The list in-
cluded (i) high investment returns with little or no risk; (ii) overly consistent 
returns; (iii) unregistered investments; (iv) unlicensed sellers; (v) secretive 
and/or complex strategies; (vi) issues with paperwork; and (vii) difficulty re-
ceiving payments. Ponzi Schemes–Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 
2010). 
 26. For example, when a purchaser buys securities and the prospectus 
contains a material misstatement or omission, section 12(a)(2) of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, as amended, provides for rescission of the purchase. See 15 
U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2006). 
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value for the cash received upon redemption.27 The Bankruptcy 
Code’s approach is sound, because “forcing innocent investors 
to return funds they contributed to the defunct entity does 
nothing more than create new victims of the fraud because it 
deprives those investors of their actual out-of-pocket contribu-
tions.”28  
Unlike the return of principal, the payment of profits out of 
a Ponzi scheme cannot survive the equivalent value test. Ac-
cordingly, profits are usually subject to clawbacks. And, in 
many cases when a Ponzi scheme is uncovered, “the only asset 
available to provide any payment to the many investors and 
other creditors are legal claims to recover sums paid out by the 
entity before the crash.”29 Profits represent transfers not 
deemed “for value” and are, therefore, “presumed to be fraudu-
lent regardless of any knowledge or intent on the part of the 
redeeming investor.”30 While the requirements of fraudulent 
conveyance might introduce a certain layer of subjectivity, such 
concerns are diminishing over time, as precedent and case law 
establish its parameters with increasing detail. 
In the Madoff case, for example, Judge Lifland’s recent de-
cision “approved the fiercely disputed method used by the 
court-appointed trustee to calculate victim losses”31 and estab-
lished that a fund investor’s losses should be defined as the dif-
ference between her investments into the fund and the amount 
withdrawn before the fund’s collapse.32 Such a decision fits 
nicely with the traditional approach.33 In embracing a so-called 
Net Investment Method, the judge scored a victory for objective 
standards and rejected the emotional arguments of hundreds of 
Madoff investors seeking a damages calculation based on the 
 
 27. See Lasko, supra note 9, at 2. 
 28. Jeffrey G. Hamilton, Clawback Claims Against Innocent Investors: 
The SEC vs. the Stanford Receiver, 28 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12, 12 (2009). 
 29. Barasch & Chesnut, supra note 1, at 924; see also Cherry & Wong, su-
pra note 2, at 395 (“In a Ponzi scheme, losing investors would therefore look, 
naturally enough, to other solvent investors who have profited from the 
scheme, whether witting or not.”). 
 30. Lasko, supra note 9, at 3. 
 31. Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Judge Endorses Trustee’s Role on Losses, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010, at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 4322471. 
 32. See In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 424 B.R. 122, 125 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010). 
 33. See, e.g., Cherry & Wong, supra note 2, at 402 (“[T]he general rule re-
garding recovery as against innocent winning investors in Ponzi schemes is 
that only payments made to them in excess of the amounts of principal origi-
nally invested are avoidable as fraudulent transfers.”). 
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securities listed on the final account statement Madoff provided 
them.34 The court noted that the superiority of the Net Invest-
ment Method derives from the fact that it “relies solely on un-
manipulated withdrawals and deposits and refuses to permit 
Madoff to arbitrarily decide who wins and who loses.”35 In ex-
plaining the desirability of a method which “looks solely to de-
posits and withdrawals that in reality occurred,” the court 
quoted extensively from the “refreshing clarity”36 of a pro se 
brief of a Madoff victim. The brief embodies the traditional re-
scission theory underpinning fraudulent conveyance and, at the 
same time, respects notions of equitable fairness:  
In a Ponzi scheme, the perpetrator takes in money from investors, 
promising a return that is wholly fictitious, and instead pays cash re-
turns to early investors with cash collected from later investors. This 
means that any cash returned to an investor was either his own, or 
more likely, was taken from another later investor. No money is ac-
tually invested for either gain or loss. Money is simply moved by the 
perpetrator from one investor to another. 
. . . . 
Such cash that [Net Winners] withdrew in excess of their deposits 
was, by definition, cash that other customers put in, NOT a return on 
their purported investment, since there was no investment made, and 
hence no return.37 
Compared to Madoff-like clawbacks in the bankruptcy con-
text, the recoupment of corporate executive compensation is a 
far newer endeavor.38 And, not surprisingly, the current crop of 
 
 34. In essence, the “Net Investment Method” favored by the trustee de-
fines an individual investor’s net equity in the fund as the amount of cash de-
posited by the customer into the customer’s account less any amounts already 
withdrawn by the investor. Cf. Madoff, 424 B.R. at 139 (“The Objecting Claim-
ants assert that Madoff customers . . . are entitled to the value of the securities 
listed on their final account statements.”); Michael Rothfeld, Madoff Trustee 
Goes After ‘Net Winners,’ WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Nov. 30, 2010, 6:04 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703994904575647234142325618 
.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection (describing Trustee Picard’s 
most recent attempts to recoup monies from those Madoff investors whose 
withdrawals were greater than their investment).  
 35. Madoff, 424 B.R. at 140. 
 36. Id. at 142. 
 37. Id. at (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for the Trustee’s Motion, 
Madoff, 424 B.R. 122 (2009) (No. 05-1631)). 
 38. See, e.g., Barasch & Chesnut, supra note 1, at 923 (noting that until 
recently, “executive officers have not faced financial liability for corporate se-
curities law violations absent an allegation that the officer had engaged in 
misconduct”). In addition, as Professors Cherry and Wong observe, the Ameri-
can Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, passed in response to the finan-
cial crisis, provides “for the recovery . . . of any bonus, retention award, or in-
centive compensation paid to a senior executive officer and any of the next 
  
2010] OMNIPRESENT CLAW 11 
 
examples derives from shakier statutory footing and suffers 
from far less robust precedent upon which to rely.39 Also con-
tributing to the difficulty of applying the clawback in the com-
pensation context is the fact that “the amount of payment in-
volved is often contingent, difficult to value, or, at times, not 
fully transparent.”40  
Following the corporate scandals of the Enron era and the 
subsequent enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sar-
banes-Oxley), attention focused on companies’ ability to recover 
incentive compensation previously awarded to senior execu-
tives in the event that their activities played a significant role 
in the restatement of a financial statement, and it was deter-
mined that the executives had received unearned incentive 
compensation as a direct result of their own misconduct.41 In 
response to these concerns, Sarbanes-Oxley included a specific 
clawback provision, section 304, which basically “empowers the 
SEC to bring an action to recover money from executives to 
blame for a fraud.”42 As Professors Cherry and Wong point out, 
however, this provision “has been largely ignored,” with very 
few enforcement actions having been brought since its adop-
tion.43 Perhaps more disappointing than the lack of case law is 
 
[twenty] most highly-compensated employees . . . based on [financial results] 
that are later found to be materially inaccurate.” Cherry & Wong, supra note 
2, at 381 (quoting from American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 517). 
 39. See Memorandum from Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, SEC Invokes 
Sarbanes-Oxley Clawback Provision Without Alleging Wrongdoing By Defen-
dant, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP (Aug. 25, 2009), http://www.willkie 
.com/files/tbl_s29Publications%5CFileUpload5686%5C3092%5CSEC%20Invokes% 
20Sarbanes%20Oxley%20Clawback%20Provision.pdf [hereinafter Willkie Farr 
Memo] (“[N]o clear definition exists of a ‘restatement due to the material non-
compliance of the issuer,’ which is a prerequisite to prosecution under the 
clawback provision.”); see also Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, Looking 
Back and Looking Forward: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Future of Corporate Gov-
ernance, 40 AKRON L. REV. 1, 29 (2007) (arguing that the clawback provisions 
of Sarbanes-Oxley are “extraordinarily weak”). 
 40. Cherry & Wong, supra note 2, at 373. 
 41. See Gibson Dunn Memo, supra note 1. 
 42. Cherry & Wong, supra note 2, at 376. For a thorough examination of 
the provision and its potential, see generally Matthew A. Melone, Adding In-
sult to Injury: The Federal Income Tax Consequences of the Clawback of Execu-
tive Compensation, 25 AKRON TAX J. 55, 63–65 (explaining the history and 
scope of the Sarbanes-Oxley clawback provisions); Rachael E. Schwartz, The 
Clawback Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: An Underutilized Incentive to Keep the 
Corporate House Clean, 64 BUS. LAW. 1 (Nov. 2008) (discussing Sarbanes-
Oxley’s clawback provision). 
 43. Cherry & Wong, supra note 2, at 376; see also Stephen Taub, SOX 304 
Forfeiture Clause Goes Unused, COMPLIANCE WKLY (June 6, 2006) (“So far, 
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the dearth of legislative and procedural history resulting from 
the hasty manner in which the Sarbanes-Oxley provision be-
came law. As one commentator noted, the Senate engaged in 
“little discussion of the clawback provision.”44 Moreover, the 
conference committee adopted the Senate’s version of the provi-
sion without modification, and the conference report accompa-
nying the law contained no substantive comments.45  
In sum, though we might wish otherwise, a close examina-
tion of the clawback reveals its limitations. A fanciful rewriting 
of yesterday’s ills suffers all the idiosyncrasies of the individual 
facts and circumstances that underlie each instance of what the 
Article’s authors might label “unfair enrichment.” Moreover, an 
after-the-fact characterization often lacks the proper respect for 
the context in which the decisions giving rise to such unfairness 
were made.  
III.  CRITIQUING CHERRY & WONG’S “CLAWBACK”   
As troubling as the idea that the broader acceptance and 
expansion of clawbacks—in either the compensation or bank-
ruptcy context—might embrace subjectivity at the expense of 
predictability, is the authors’ suggestion that contractual claw-
backs be written into investment agreements and employment 
contracts as a matter of course.46 In fact, this view is not theirs 
alone. Increasingly, politicians, commentators, and regulators 
are embracing some recoupment method to correct perceived 
past wrongs.47 Prospective contractual clawbacks represent a 
 
that seemingly significant provision of SOX has proven to be a dud when regu-
lators and aggrieved investors try to retrieve prior bonuses and compensation 
earned thanks to fraud.”). But cf. SEC v. Jenkins, Civ. No. CV 09-1510-PHX-
JWS, D. Ariz., July 22, 2009, SEC Litigation Release No. 21149A (July 23, 
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21149a.htm 
(announcing litigation seeking the clawback of bonuses and stock sale 
proceeds from Maynard L. Jenkins, the former chief executive officer of a pub-
lic company that the SEC had previously charged with fraud, absent an alle-
gation that Jenkins had any involvement in or knowledge of the corporate 
misconduct). The SEC recently scored a victory as the court denied a motion to 
dismiss. See Jef Feeley and Emily Heller, Former CSK Chief Executive Jenkins 
Loses Bid to Dismiss SEC Clawback Suit, BLOOMBERG (June 10, 2010), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-10/former-csk-chief-executive-jenkins-loses 
-bid-to-dismiss-sec-clawback-suit.html. 
 44. Willkie Farr Memo, supra note 39, at 3. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Cherry & Wong, supra note 2, at 372 (“[W]e suggest writing pro-
spective clawback terms into contracts directly.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1904 (providing for a broader 
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natural progression from recent events and seem the perfect 
tonic to the authors’ view that “the 2009 Recovery Act’s provi-
sions regarding executive compensation are extremely proble-
matic.”48 In a certain sense, this prescription is not controver-
sial, as it aspires to a world of more developed contractual 
negotiation ex ante in the hope of avoiding uncertainty ex 
post.49 And, the idea is born of the notion that “attempting to 
impose clawbacks retroactively through legislation is certainly 
not as efficient as including clawback provisions organically 
within the body of the initial contract.”50 As the remainder of 
this Response hopes to show, however, the devil lies in the de-
tails.  
As Professors Cherry and Wong correctly observe, in the 
investment fund context, the inclusion of such contractual 
clawbacks as boilerplate might be frustrated by the lack of priv-
ity among investors, as “the investment structure usually con-
sists of individual, separate contracts between each investor 
and the investment fund.”51 The fix offered for this impediment 
 
clawback than the executive compensation clawback embodied in the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act); LATHAM & WATKINS, A Tale of Two Clawbacks: The Com-
pensation Consequences of Misstated Financials, Latham & Watkins Client 
Alert (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub3662_1 
.pdf#page=1 (summarizing the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 
304 and Dodd-Frank Act section 954); Adam Levitin, Shared Appreciation 
Clawbacks, CREDITSLIPS (Jan. 15, 2009, 8:40 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/ 
creditslips/2009/01/shared-appreciation-clawbacks-.html (considering the 
clawback of principal for creditors in the event that there is an appreciation on 
a mortgage following its modification); Larry MacDonald, Claw Back the 
Bankers’ Bonuses, CANADIAN BUS. ONLINE (Sept. 11, 2008), http://www 
.canadianbusiness.com/columnists/larry_macdonald/article.jsp?content=20080911_ 
152853_13064 (“[E]xecutives who reaped outsized gains from bonuses, stock 
options, and other ‘performance’ perks during the era of frenzied growth, 
should be compelled to disgorge those benefits.”); Dylan Ratigan, Fix the Defi-
cit: Clawbacks Before Cutbacks, HUFFINGTON POST (June 28, 2010), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/dylan-ratigan/fix-the-deficit-clawbacks_b_628243.html 
(“It’s time to tell these bankers that if you can change rules to steal money 
from the taxpayer, we can the [sic] change rules to take it back.”); Andrew 
Ross Sorkin, ed., Lawmakers Call on Six Firms to Claw Back Bonuses, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (July 29, 2010), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2010/07/29/lawmakers-call-on-6-firms-to-claw-back-bonuses/ (reporting that 
more than forty members of Congress called on six financial firms to halt ex-
ecutive bonuses and return monies to the government from bonuses chal-
lenged by Kenneth Feinberg). 
 48. Cherry & Wong, supra note 2, at 385. 
 49. See id. at 415 (discussing the frustration of retroactive application as 
opposed to prospective efforts); Ribstein, supra note 4 (arguing for a prospec-
tive application of clawback provisions).  
 50. Cherry & Wong, supra note 2, at 383–84. 
 51. Id. at 407. 
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is to limit the enforceability of the clawback and subsequent 
redistribution to other investors with similar clawbacks in their 
investment contracts.52 Yet, such a system leaves a participat-
ing investor to roll the dice on whether he will have company in 
the event the clawback is triggered. If not, there seems little 
benefit to his election, as a resulting redistribution takes on a 
sense of the arbitrary. In fact, without the complete participa-
tion of all of a fund’s investors in such a plan, the coveted per-
fect redistribution according to the principle of fairness remains 
elusive. For example, Professors Cherry and Wong prefer the 
contractual approach in the Ponzi scheme context because it al-
lows for the risk of fraud to be “more equally allocated among 
the investors” through “equitable redistribution among all in-
nocent investors on a pro rata basis, in accordance with the 
principal amount invested.”53 Such a result relies on the inclu-
sion of all investors and a perfect ability to make subjective 
characterizations of “innocent investors.” In the end, then, such 
a system embodies some of the very subjectivity it seeks to 
avoid. Moreover, the boilerplate contractual investment agree-
ment clawback regime the authors prescribe leaves a great 
many questions unresolved.  
First, the world of investment contracts is characterized by 
intense and detailed negotiation and customization. The result-
ing contractual provisions are based upon the relative bargain-
ing strength of an individual investor and the fund itself (and 
the skill, experience and attention of their respective counsel). 
Very rarely will two investors enjoy identical agreements with 
a fund. Instead, side letters will often memorialize additional 
private arrangements, often accompanied by a provision for 
confidentiality.54 Moreover, the agreements with individual in-
vestors are negotiated and signed over time, as funds contract 
with new investors as they find them. The negotiation, custom-
ization, individual tastes of investors, evolving mindset of the 
investment fund, and various provisions for confidentiality are 
all likely to frustrate any regime that relies on standardization 
of investment contracts for enforcement.  
 
 52. See id. 
 53. Id. at 405–06.  
 54. For a general discussion of the proliferation of side letters and their 
contents, see FRANCOIS-SERGE LHABITANT, HANDBOOK OF HEDGE FUNDS 119–
20 (2006) (“[S]ide letters are used to cut side deals outside the constitutional or 
contractual arrangements of the hedge fund with specific investors, sometimes 
to the detriment of other investors.”). 
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Second, the reflexive embrace of compensation clawbacks 
might have drawbacks of its own, and firms “might rationally 
decide against including such provisions in employment agree-
ments.”55 A future, subjective assessment that revisits the wis-
dom of a past payment can be a tricky business.56 And, the val-
ue of the device as a compensation recovery tool may prove 
somewhat limited. Often, the valuation difficulties of yesterday 
remain today. Measurement issues are exacerbated by a hind-
sight bias and the fact that cause and effect are not easily un-
derstood or reconciled.57 In addition, the timing and responsi-
bility of profits or losses can be challenging to assign.58 It is not 
surprising then that the Sarbanes-Oxley attempts at compen-
sation recovery are triggered by wrongdoing or responsibility 
for bad acts, as any lesser standard will likely suffer significant 
measurement difficulties.59  
Aside from measurement problems, the practical difficul-
ties of getting employees to return paychecks that they have al-
ready cashed, spent, and paid taxes on are likely to represent a 
significant burden to effective implementation.60 And, there 
 
 55. Ribstein, supra note 4. 
 56. See Alexis Leondis & Margaret Collins, Spending Bonus Cash Becomes 
Risky as Clawback Rules Increase, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 8, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aYy32W7YlV38 
(“Defining excessively risky behavior in a quantifiable way is almost impossi-
ble.”). 
 57. Very generally, “hindsight bias” refers to the tendency, after the fact, 
to believe that our forecasts were more accurate than they actually were. See 
generally Baruch Fischhoff, An Early History of Hindsight Research, 25 SOC. 
COGNITION 10 (2007), available at http://sds.hss.cmu.edu/media/pdfs/fischhoff/ 
HindsightEarlyHistory.pdf (representing a description of the history of hind-
sight bias research by its creator). 
 58. Practical considerations notwithstanding, the recent meddling of the 
federal government into the area of clawbacks represents “just one little as-
pect of the mammoth federalization of corporate law.” Ribstein, supra note 4. 
At least in the realm of executive compensation, these efforts have trampled a 
previously respected area for private negotiation. The concern is not lost on 
Professor Ribstein, who recently observed that writing a clawback provision 
into a federal law “sets in stone a novel approach to disclosure penalties and 
executive pay despite the lack of a clear idea what its consequences will be. 
The need for flexibility and experimentation is a good reason for leaving com-
pensation arrangements to contracts and the market for state law.” Id. 
59. See Melone, supra note 42, at 74 (highlighting many of the difficulties 
surrounding the discretion that might accompany a clawback provision). 
 60. See Stephen Gandel, Can Financial Firms Get Executives to Give Back 
Pay?, TIME, (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.time.com/time/business/ 
article/0,8599,1956081,00.html (describing the differences in design of the re-
cently adopted Wall Street clawbacks). Also, not addressed directly in this Re-
sponse, is the idea that wage laws in some states may limit the ability to re-
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seems no end to the subjectivity that can be implicated once the 
clawback seal is breached, as a high-minded company might 
design its clawback policy with considerable discretion and flex-
ibility. For example, the company might desire to waive the re-
payment requirement of an employee unable to return the re-
quired amount without undue hardship. The exercise of such 
discretion, however benevolent, would compromise the consis-
tent and fair implementation of the policy.61 Again, subjectivity 
abounds!  
Third, there remains the additional question of whether 
(and to what extent) privately negotiated provisions, whether 
in the investment agreement or executive compensation con-
text, will be respected by a regulator or a court. As the Madoff 
investors now appreciate, albeit in the retroactive context, the 
actions of bankruptcy courts and trustees can be difficult to 
predict. Also, if we have learned anything from our recent eco-
nomic history, we know that the swings of public opinion make 
government policy subject to volatility. Moreover, when big 
money is on the line, appeals and legislative influence are like-
ly to be fully exhausted.62  
Finally, the authors seem to sidestep the question of the 
appropriate time bar on the ability of a party to recoup monies 
via clawback. Under the Bankruptcy Code, for example, a 
trustee is allowed two years from the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition to assert preference or avoidance actions,63 and state 
law claims for fraudulent transfer or fraudulent conveyance 
 
cover amounts paid or owed in connection with the performance of services. 
See generally Scott E. Landau & Bradley A. Benedict, How Effective Is Your 
Clawback?, PILLSBURY ADVISORY (Feb. 3, 2010), at 3, http://www.pillsburylaw 
.com/index.cfm?pageid=34&itemid=39549 (discussing how wage laws limit the 
ability to recover). For a terrific summary of the practical tax implications of 
clawbacks in the executive compensation setting, see Melone, supra note 42. 
 61. See Landau & Benedict, supra note 60, at 3 (observing that certain 
selective applications might “implicate the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s prohibition 
against issuing companies granting loans or extending credit to executive of-
ficers and directors”). 
 62. See, e.g., Henriques, supra note 8 (describing the high likelihood of 
appeal in the Madoff case); see also Press Release, Congressman Gary Acker-
man, Members of Congress Introduce Legislation to Improve Relief for Victims 
of Madoff & All Ponzi Schemes,(Apr. 15, 2010), available at http://ackerman 
.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=186&parentid=4&sectiontree=&itemid=978 
(describing legislative efforts aimed at, among other things, restricting the 
SIPC from clawing back funds from Ponzi scheme victims “regardless of 
whether or not they had any involvement in or knowledge of the fraud”). 
 63. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(a)(1) (2006). 
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typically range from two to six years.64 Further, section 304 of 
Sarbanes-Oxley provides for recoupment of compensation re-
ceived within the twelve-month period following the public re-
lease of financial information that was subsequently restated.65 
In all cases, these laws respect the idea that there must be 
some deadline following payment after which the recipient 
should be allowed to exhale—and to debit the reserves account 
on its balance sheet. 
  CONCLUSION   
Both the AIG bonus saga and the issues surrounding the 
appropriate Madoff redistributions among fund investors con-
tinue to wind their way through the American system of justice 
and the court of public opinion.66 Each brings its own complexi-
ty and, in each case, regardless of result, one party or the other 
will undoubtedly feel aggrieved.67 The use of the clawback de-
vice is likely to expand in the years ahead, however, as the 
American public adjusts from decades of perceived abundance 
to the sobering reality of economic scarcity.68 Professors Cherry 
 
 64. See generally Lasko, supra note 9, at 4 (“Fraudulent conveyance ac-
tions under the Bankruptcy Code apply to transfers occurring up to two years 
prior to the bankruptcy petition.”). New York, for example, has a six year stat-
ute of limitations for fraudulent conveyance. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(8) (McKinney 
2010) (“[T]he time within which [an] action [based upon fraud] must be com-
menced shall be the greater of six years from the date the cause of action ac-
crued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the 
plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have 
discovered it.”). 
 65. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (2006). 
 66. See, e.g., Alan Rappeport, Madoff’s Investors to Face Clawback Law-
suits, FIN. TIMES (July 26, 2010), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 
625742be-98ee-11df-9418-00144feab49a.html (suggesting that the Madoff 
trustee is moving toward the phase of the recovery effort that includes seeking 
the return of proceeds from Madoff “net winners”). 
 67. See, e.g., Henriques, supra note 8 (quoting Judge Lifland as saying 
“[n]o matter how I come down and rule, it will be unpalatable to one party or 
another”). 
 68. See, e.g., Mary Thompson, Pay Czar Will Seek Stricter Clawbacks from 
TARP Firms, CNBC (July 20, 2010), http://www.cnbc.com/id/38333143?__ 
source=aol%7Cheadline%7Cquote%7Ctext%7C&par=aol (reporting that Ken-
neth Feinberg, the Special Master for Executive Compensation, will ask sev-
eral financial firms to strengthen their clawback provisions in executive pay 
agreements, but will not require the firms to recover bonuses paid at the 
height of the financial crisis); see also Cassidy, supra note 7, (suggesting that 
the clawback has not taken hold because of a “straightforward coordination 
problem” and imploring the Federal Reserve to implement new pay guidelines 
for Wall Street that include a sensible clawback); Joann S. Lublin, Law Shar-
pens “Clawback” Rules for Improper Pay, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2010), http:// 
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and Wong have done an invaluable service in providing the 
opening framework through which academicians, practitioners, 
investors, and firms can begin to think more deeply about the 
clawback and its uses and limitations. That said, as relevant 
stakeholders are reminded with each passing day, the mere 
presence of a clawback, whether explicitly provided ex ante or 
added in an attempt at equity ex post, is no panacea. In fact, 
the clawback itself can often increase the mess, adding a layer 
of cost and complexity in the form of uncertainty, unpredictabil-
ity, and discontinuity. 
 
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704249004575385500170389086.html 
(observing that the new financial overhaul law requires the SEC to order com-
panies to adopt clawback policies). 
